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Abstract
A theorem from Archimedes on the area of a circle is proved in a setting where
some inconsistency is permissible, by using paraconsistent reasoning. The new proof
emphasizes that the famous method of exhaustion gives approximations of areas closer
than any consistent quantity. This is equivalent to the classical theorem in a classical
context, but not in a context where it is possible that there are inconsistent infinites-
imals. The area of the circle is taken ‘up to inconsistency’. The fact that the core of
Archimedes’s proof still works in a weaker logic is evidence that the integral calculus
and analysis more generally are still practicable even in the event of inconsistency.
1 Introduction: Reductio without absurdity
“Reductio ad absurdum,” wrote G.H. Hardy, “is a far finer gambit than any chess gambit; a
chess player may offer the sacrifice of a pawn or even a piece, but the mathematician offers
the game” [13, p.34]. Hardy means that, if an inconsistency were per impossible proved in
the process of giving an argument by contradiction, then not only the proof, but the entirety
of mathematics would be sacrificed. This may seem a bit dramatic. At least, it raises a
straightforward question: how much basic geometry and analysis would still be practicable
in the event that there were a contradiction somewhere?1 In the event of inconsistency,
which theorems would still be true?
Mathematics as understood in classical logic has an absolute answer. If p and not-p
were provable, for some sentence p, then q is provable, for any sentence q whatsoever, by
the logical rule of ex falso quodlibet or ‘explosion’. Any local inconsistency immediately
becomes a global catastrophe; in the event of contradiction, everything is true—and so
pointless. This seems to be what Hardy had in mind. Perhaps relatedly, mathematics is
widely practiced with a more pragmatic answer: any ‘logician’s contradiction’ cannot matter
for real mathematics, and is not worth worrying about.2
1As was the case for the original infinitesimal calculus [4, ch. 5], [6, p.191-219]; [5].
2Does the following sentiment sound familiar? “If ever the day comes when the logicians find some
inconsistency in arithmetic, our reaction will surely be, ‘Oh that’s just a trick of the logicians; let them
worry about it.’ And one can almost hear the inconsistency coming—perhaps there will be a proof of the
existence of a contradiction, but that contradiction is too long to even contemplate, so we may quite happily
behave as if it did not exist” [14, p.204]. But see also [20].
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So the classical answer to our question is either apocalyptic, or indifferent, or both.
Inconsistent mathematics proposes a middle ground. Paraconsistent (or non-trivially in-
consistent) mathematics is the project of seeking a finer-grained answer to the consistency
question, by giving proofs that do not rely on ‘explosion’ [16]. Many have argued that explo-
sion is not in fact a good inference principle, not capturing what is meant by sound mathe-
matical reasoning [1], and have sought to develop mathematics without it [7, 9, 11, 17, 18].
Theorems thereby established are those that hold true independently of consistency. This
is an impressive feature of mathematical truth: much as in everyday life, the facts survive
even in the face of some level of inconsistency.3
In this note, we set ourselves the exercise of returning to the conceptual roots of the
integral calculus, and examining an argument by reductio, from Archimedes’ Measurement
of the circle [2, 8]. The basic idea is to approximate the area of a circle by exhausting it
with triangles. The point is to see whether the result will still hold in a paraconsistent
logic—to imagine that Euclid, Archimedes, et al in the discovery days of basic geometry,
happened to be reasoning paraconsistently. Regardless of whether simple geometry would
ever be susceptible to contradiction, it is enlightening to see that it could withstand local
inconsistency.
Our concerns are practical. This note is not a ‘logical foundations of infinitesimal analysis
done paraconsistently’; see [15]. As has always been the case historically, the first step is to
develop clearer intuitions about what any such foundations will be founding.
2 Archemedes’ Original Argument
In the third century BCE, Archimedes wrote a short treatise in which he proves:
The area of any circle is equal to a right-angled triangle in which one of the sides
about the right angle is equal to the radius, and the other to the circumference,
of the circle. [2, p. 91]
Archimedes asks us to consider a circle Ω with radius r and circumference C; then he sets
out to prove that a right triangle ∆ with height r and base C will have the same area. The
argument is a reductio, by cases on trichotomy: either the area of Ω is identical to the area
of ∆ (in which case we are done), or else one is bigger than the other. But, Archimedes
argues, either of the latter options lead to contradictions, namely, that some quantity x is
3All paraconsistent proofs are also classical proofs: any result established using a paraconsistent logic
may also be established classically, by the same argument as the paraconsistent reasoner. (In the event of a
contradiction, classically everything follows anyway (by ex falso), so in particular the result of the theorem
still follows.) In this sense, classical mathematics can be thought of as an interpretation of paraconsistent
mathematics—an interpretation where there are no local contradictions. (Moretensen [16] calls this the
‘special case’ thesis.) The mathematical universe, when studied paraconsistently, is at least as rich as the
classical one.
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both strictly less than and strictly greater than some given quantity K:
x < K < x
If true, then x = K, and then x < x and K < K, which is absurd, q.e.d. This proof is not
paraconsistently valid, for several reasons.
First, Archimedes presumes that when a contradiction is derivable from an assumption,
the assumption is proved to be false. But, as with all mathematics, any number of side
assumptions may have been used to get to the contradiction. One of these assumptions is
false, even for a paraconsistent mathematician, but we don’t know which one. Perhaps it
was the assumption that the areas in question have a non-zero difference; but perhaps it
was the ‘archimedean’ assumption that there are no infinitesimals.
And this leads to the second problem for the proof. Even if we did know which as-
sumption is at fault, we would need single it out. Classically, given a disjunction (either
assumption p is false or assumption q is false), if p is not false, then it follows that q is the
culprit we are looking for. But this pattern of reasoning is exactly what must be avoided if
we are to avoid reliance on consistency. For supposing some p and not-p proven; then the
argument
p, not-p or q ∴ q
leads inexorably to explosion, and must be invalid.4 While this argument form, disjunctive
syllogism, was one of the Stoic’s ‘Five Indemonstrables,’ denying it is the prerequisite of
paraconsistent research; and “we suppose that it is better to deny an Indemonstrable than
a Demonstrable” [1, p. 488]. Disjunctive syllogism is not a truth-preserving inference in
inconsistent contexts. It leads from a local inconsistency to a global absurdity.
Finally, Archimedes assumes that a quantity ε such that ε < ε is simply absurd. To
be sure, a quantity being strictly less than (or greater than) itself may well turn out to
be absurd. But this begs our general question. Suspending judgement about individual
contradictions, and not resorting to ex falso quodlibet, we ought not presuppose that this
possibility is ruled out.
There are therefore serious obstacles to reconstructing this proof paraconsistently. One
might even take these difficulties to vindicate the classical dependence on consistency. This
would be premature, however. Below we show that the area of a unit circle is logic invariant
(cf. [16]), derivable come what may.
4The proof is due to CI Lewis: suppose p and not-p. But p implies p or q. Then this together with not-p
implies q, where q could be any sentence whatsoever.
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3 Axioms and Cancellation Properties
3.1 Logic
An underlying paraconsistent logic is assumed. For concreteness, fix it to be the three valued
logic rm3 [16, p. 22], with truth values true (t), false (f), and both (b), and truth tables:
¬
t f
b b
f t
∧ t b f
t t b f
b b b f
f f f f
∨ t b f
t t t t
b t b b
f t b f
→ t b f
t t f f
b t b f
f t t t
The acceptable values are t and b. Then rm3 validity is preservation of t or b forward,
or equivalently, falsity preservation backward: if the conclusion of an argument is f , unac-
ceptable, then one of the premises is unacceptable. But all that really matters here is that
the logic has a conditional for which modus ponens is valid, and has a De Morgan negation
that does everything Boolean negation does—exclude the middle, double negation eliminate,
etc.—except it does not explode: in rm3, p ∧ ¬p → q can have an acceptable antecedent
but unacceptable consequent, making the implication simply fail. Arbitrary contradictions
do not entail arbitrary conclusions.5
3.2 Order
Assume given a set of points, P,Q,R, . . . and a set of paths PQ,PR,RS, . . . . Paths may be
represented as single variables L,M,N . . . , and the term ‘path’ applies equally to magnitude
(path length) as it does to a particular path. With Archimedes, we assume that paths are
(length-)ordered by 6, even in inconsistent settings:
• L 6 L (reflexivity)
• If L 6M and M 6 L then L = M (antisymmetry)
• If L 6M and M 6 N then L 6M (transitivity)
• L 6M or M 6 L (linearity)
Define a strict order by L < M := L 6M ∧M 6 L. Then L < M implies L 6M , but not
vice versa. Strict order is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, and total (see [15]):
• L = M or L < M or M < L (trichotomy)
5This is a conservative intuition. If we wanted to maintain the possibility of inconsistency, but didn’t
mind global absurdity, we would not need a paraconsistent logic!
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Note that N < N is an outright contradiction, N 6 N ∧N 6 N , but of a sort that could
be tolerable if such a path also turned out to have interesting non-trivial properties.
The space of paths comes equipped with the arithmetic operator + such that if PQ and
QR are paths, then PQ + QR is a path. The operator + may be seen as concatenation of
paths. The direction of a path can also be indicated: if L is a path, then −L is a path. Two
standard properties of inequalities are assumed: when L+N and M +N are defined,
• L < M implies L+N < M +N
• L < M implies −M < −L
Notably, we do not presume that inverses cancel, L + −L = 0. It is too close to being the
geometric equivalent of the logical ex falso quodlibet, since any pairs L,−L give the same
‘bottom’ particle, 0.
3.3 Archimedes’ Axioms
Our target theorem requires little by way of geometric assumptions. We follow Archimedes
and take the following as axiomatic.
Axiom 1 (Triangle Inequality). PQ+QR > PR
A line is the shortest distance between two points: the line L from P to Q is a path such
that any other path (PQ)′ > L. A line between two points is unique by antisymmetry.
Axiom 2. Let P,Q be points, L the line from P,Q, and M,N two other concave paths
from P to Q, both on the same side of L. If M is entirely bounded between L and N , then
M < N .
Although the goal is eventually to work with infinitesimals, we take the notable step
of including the assumption that none exist;6 therefore any infinitesimals will also just be
standard reals, unlike in Robinson’s work. We return to this point, about uniformity, in the
conclusion §6 below.
Axiom 3 (Archimedes’ Axiom). For 0 < L < M , there is a quantity n such that M 6 Ln.
The quantity n mentioned in Axiom 3 is traditionally taken to be a natural number.
We take the same view here, and accept the intuitive idea of the natural numbers as inex-
haustible, in the sense that, given a natural number N , a larger one (N + 1) may always
be found. Areas are, likewise, treated intuitively. For the present paper, the only area that
6This is, paraconsistently, subtly different from the claim that their existence is absurd—the existence
of infinitesimals is, under the present assumption, contradictory, but the ambient logic will ideally prevent
this from resulting in global incoherence.
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matters is that of a triangle and that of a circle. We shall have need only explicitly for the
area of a triangle, which, in accordance with normal practice, is taken to be:
A∆ =
1
2
base× perpendicular height
Like Archimedes, we work with Euclid’s Elements in the background, e.g. that triangles
with the same base and height are equal. A large theme of Euclid is that of the common
notions and postulates, and we use these here, too: especially the idea that the whole is
greater than the part (Euclid, Common Notion 5).
4 Inscribing and Circumscribing
The method of Archimedes’ proof is approximation by exhaustion. Let Ω be a circle with
centre O, radius r and circumference C. Let σ2 be a square inscribed in Ω, and for n > 2
let σn be the polygon with 2
n sides obtained by dividing arcs of Ω in half along sides of
σn. Let Σ2 be a square circumscribed around Ω, and let Σn be the polygon with 2
n sides
(n > 2) obtained by dividing arcs of Ω in half along sides of Σn; see Fig. 1.
O
Ω
O
Ω
Figure 1: The circle Ω (dotted line), with: polygons σ2 (solid line) and σ3 (dashed line)
inscribed (left); and polygons Σ2 (solid line) and Σ3 (dashed line) circumscribed (right).
Notation: For any figure Θ, let AΘ be the area of Θ.
Contrary to Archimedes’s proof, we proceed by direct proof. The following two lemmata
are responsible for the main work of the proof:
Lemma 1. The areas of inscribed polygons are less than the areas of the figures containing
them, and circumscribed polygons are greater:
(i) Aσn < AΩ and Aσn < A∆;
(ii) AΣn > AΩ and AΣn > A∆.
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Proof. To prove (i), for each k, take any side s of σk and consider a triangle τk with base
equal to s and height equal to the perpendicular distance d from O to that side. Then the
area of the polygon Aσk is
Aσk = 2
kAτk =
1
2
2ksd.
Now the length of the perpendicular d is less than r, and by Axiom 2 the length of the side
s is less then length of the segment of the circle it spans (so the perimeter of the polygon,
2ks, is less than the circumference of the circle, C), so
Aσk =
1
2
2ksd <
1
2
Cr = A∆.
The argument for (ii) is similar, but with a subtlety. For each k, take any side S of Σk and
construct a triangle Tk with base equal to S and height equal to the perpendicular distance
d from O to that side, which is just r. The area of the polygon AΣk is 2
kATk. Consider
the segment OPQ (see Fig. 2 below) bounded by the circle and two perpendiculars from
adjacent sides of Σk (OP and OQ). Note that PR+RQ =
1
2S +
1
2S = S. By Axiom 2 the
O
P
Q
R
Figure 2: An arc (dotted) of the circle between perpendiculars of adjacent sides of Σk.
length PR + RQ is greater than the length of the arc PQ. Thus 2kS is greater than the
circumference of the circle, C, and so
AΣk =
1
2
2kSd >
1
2
Cr = A∆
as required.
Lemma 2. Given any ε > 0, there is a positive integer n such that AΣn −Aσn < ε.
Proof. Set ηk = AΣk −Aσk. With reference to Fig. 3, observe that
ηk = 2
kA∆PRQ
ηk+1 = 2
k+1A∆PTS
and that, since ∆PRV is a triangle with the same height but smaller base than ∆PRS ,
1
2
A∆PRQ = A∆PRV > A∆PTS +A∆TRS . (1)
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P Q
R
V
S
T W
Figure 3: Partial edges of successive Σk (solid; edges PR + RQ and PT + TW + WQ for
successive k) and σk (dashed; edges PQ and PS + SQ for successive k) together with a
circle segment (dotted).
Now since ∆TRS is right-angled, and ∆PTS isosceles, we have
TR > TS = PT.
Consequently,
A∆PTS < A∆TRS . (2)
Combining (1) and (2) gives
1
2
A∆PRQ > 2A∆PTS .
Multiplication by 2k yields
1
2
ηk > ηk+1.
Given ε > 0, use Axiom 3 to choose n such that
1
2n
(AΣ1 −Aσ1) < ε; then
AΣn −Aσn = ηn < 1
2
ηn−1 <
1
22
ηn−2 < · · · < 1
2n
η1 =
1
2n
(AΣ1 −Aσ1) < ε
as required.
5 Measuring the circle
In the sequel, by not taking consistency for granted, we do not lose any information, but we
do gain insight into what the theorem really says about approximations: that without the
assumption of consistency, they are only approximate.
A final bit of notation: for any quantities a, b,
|a− b| =
a− b if a > b or b = ab− a if b > a
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The notation is unambiguous, even given the possibility of inconsistency, since if b < a and
a < b then b = a, so b− a = a− b.
First let us argue the proof in the spirit of Archimedes, as a ‘reductio’, before giving the
official proof. There are three cases:
AΩ < A∆ or AΩ = A∆ or AΩ > A∆
Suppose AΩ > A∆. Inscribe polygons σn. Set δn = AΩ − Aσn. Find N1 such that
δN1 < AΩ−A∆, using Lemma 2. Then for each N > N1,
AΩ−AσN < AΩ−A∆
Let η := AΩ−AΩ. Since AΩ−AσN < AΩ−A∆,
A∆ + η < AσN + η (3)
But by Lemma 1, AσN < A∆, so
AσN + η < A∆ + η (4)
Combining (3) and (4) we have
AσN + η = A∆ + η (5)
for each N > N1, and a fortiori
A∆ + η < A∆ + η (6)
A contradiction several times over.
Well. In the other case, supposing that AΩ < A∆, then carrying out same procedure
with circumscribed Σn, obtain N2 such that
• A∆−AΩ < AΣN −AΩ and
• A∆−AΩ > AΣN −AΩ
i.e. A∆ + η = AΣN + η, and a fortiori
A∆ + η < A∆ + η
Therefore in this case, and a fortiori for all cases,
AΩ = A∆
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or else
|AΩ− (A∆ + η)| < |AΩ− (A∆ + η)|
as required.
Theorem 3. Let Ω be a circle with radius r and circumference C, and ∆ a right triangle
with height r and base C. Then for any ε > 0, |A∆−AΩ| < ε.
Proof. For any k, Lemma 1 gives
Aσk < AΩ < AΣk
Aσk < A∆ < AΣk
Subtracting the two,
Aσk −AΣk < AΩ−A∆ < AΣk −Aσk.
Lemma 2 gives n such that
−ε < Aσn −AΣn < AΩ−A∆ < AΣn −Aσn < ε,
so that
|AΩ−A∆| < ε
as required.
The areas of Ω and ∆ are arbitrarily—infinitesimally—close. They are within inconsis-
tency of each other:
Proposition 4. If |a− b| < ε for all ε > 0, then either a = b or |a− b| < |a− b|.
Proof. Either |a − b| = 0 (in which case we are done) or else |a − b| > 0. But then since
|a− b| < ε for all ε > 0, pick |a− b| for ε.
An approximation up to infinitesimal closeness is therefore only an identity if the possi-
bility of inconsistency is disregarded, that is, if the case where |a− b| < |a− b| is eliminated
by disjunctive syllogism. This corollary to theorem 3 is stated thus:
Theorem 5. Let Ω be a circle with radius r and circumference C, and ∆ a right triangle
with height r and base C. If a = b whenever |a− b| < ε for all ε > 0, then
AΩ = A∆.
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6 Identical up to inconsistency
Theorems 3 and 5 are classically equivalent restatements of the classical theorem. In fact,
Theorem 5 is a version of the theorem with paraconsistently the same conclusion as the
classical one—but it requires hypotheses which are stronger than the classical hypotheses in
this setting. The attraction of this version of the theorem is that it clearly demonstrates a
so-called “consistency requirement” that is classically trivial and so unmentioned, brought
out explicitly here. Moreover, this version of the theorem does little violence to the intuition
of the classical mathematician, who regards the additional hypothesis as inviolably true.7
We hasten to point out that making consistency assumptions explicit (e.g. in the distinc-
tion between theorems 3 and 5), is not being offered as a ‘solution’ to possible inconsistency.
Adding a consistency assumption in the premise does not lead to consistency. From [1,
p503, vol 2]: “One thing is clear is that adding premises cannot possibly reduce threat”.
Nor are we suggesting that, if presented with an inconsistency, mathematicians should gen-
erally accept it and carry on, rather than looking for revised consistent theories. Rather the
point is that consistency can be considered to be a substantive assumption, made explicit,
and in cases when it cannot be assured (like in the original naive theory of sets, or even
in arithmetic due to Go¨del’s second theorem) mathematicians can still work and reason
through.
The area of Ω is identical to the area of ∆ up to inconsistency, in the same vein as two
structures are said to be identical up to isomorphism. One could understand classicality to
be the thesis that identity up to inconsistency just is identity. Classically, ‘the fact that p-up-
to-inconsistency’ is just ‘the fact that p’. The only classical possibility is the ‘consistentized’
version of Proposition 4,
if ∀ε > 0(|x− y| < ε) then x = y. (7)
This is precisely the property of real numbers that is responsible for producing Archimedes’s
conclusion. A paraconsistent reconstruction isolates the impact of various classical assump-
tions without altering the fundamental facts.8
It is well-known that (7) fails in the hyperreals [12], though its “transfer” holds (that
7This is a well-known feature of constructive mathematics, also( see e.g. [3]). For example, the classical
intermediate value theorem (IVT),
[IVT] For any continuous function f , if f(0) < 0 and f(1) > 0 then there exists x ∈ (0, 1)
such that f(x) = 0.
is not constructively provable, whereas two versions, classically equivalent to the IVT, are:
[Constructive IVT] For any continuous locally non-constant function f , if f(0) < 0 and
f(1) > 0 then there exists x ∈ (0, 1) such that f(x) = 0.
[Approximate IVT] Given ε > 0 and any continuous function f , if f(0) < 0 and f(1) > 0
then there exists x ∈ (0, 1) such that |f(x)| < ε.
8Anderson and Belnap called this situation ‘p or Funny Bussiness’.
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is, if ε is allowed to range over infinitesimals). This points to the difference between our
approach and Robinson’s famous work [19]. What we present is a uniform practice. In
contrast, the traditional theory of the nonstandard numbers involves: a ‘special’ class of
infinitesimal numbers; two separate formal languages (one for the ‘standard’ numbers, and
one for infinitesimals, etc.) with some strict rules about what can and cannot be formulated
in these languages; use of Zorn’s Lemma to show that free ultrafilters exist; a transfer
principle to translate statements between these languages (only if they are “appropriately
formulated” [12, p. 11]); a distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ objects; etc. Without
diminishing Robinson’s significant achievements, the work here begins to show how it is
possible to recapture the flexibility of ‘infinitesimal’ arguments without needing to call on
advanced machinery from model theory.
There is comfort to be had knowing that the area of the circle is indifferent to changes in
logic. The core of Archimede’s insight is derivable even in the event of inconsistency. Truth
is not so fragile.9
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